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QUANTITATIVESYSTEMS OF SOCIOLOGY
by Franz Adler, Department of Sociology, University of Arkansas
Recently the news appeared in the dally papers that some
mathematicians had discovered the possibility of applying mathe-
matical formulas to human and social phenomena. 1) The implica-
tion was that now comprehensive mathematical systems for the
description and prediction of all human behavior were available.
Actually, the construction of such a system has been the final
goal of many workers in the social sciences for almost a century
and a half. Since Auguste Comte, many have thought that, some
day, it would be possible to establish a system of a universal
and unified science, covering the social phenomena as well as the
physical and biological ones. And while there is quite a number
of social scientists who do not believe that it will ever be pos-
sible to describe all social phenomena mathematically, either
because they are too complex or because they are of some sort of
non-quantitative nature, there Is a still more sizable number of
workers who try to find mathematical expressions for those parts
of the social universe they have empirically studied. To them,
an announcement like the one mentioned above must have come as
quite a surprise.
When Sir Isaac Newton laid the foundations to what Is now a
system of physics, he was enabled to do so not only by his own
genius and by his own informal observations of apples falling
from trees, but also by the amount of quantitative knowledge
which he found ready for his use in the works of Copernicus,
Kepler, Galilei, and others. Inventors do not fall from
heaven. They are the ones who find or fashion the stone that
closes and makes the arch, that tops and completes the pyramid.
This is true of scientific systems as well as of steam engines.
The system builder like the engine constructor Is tied to the
state of the technology he finds when he starts building, only
that in his case the state of scientific formulation is concerned
while In the case of the mechanical inventor the state of tool
making, power production, power transmission, etc. are the foun-
dations that matter. The trouble with the recent mathematical
systems which have been so highly advertised Is that they have
all been constructed without the benefit of a sufficiently well
developed basis in mathematically expressed empirical knowledge,
of social fact.
Thus, N. Rashevsky in his Mathematical Theory of Human Rela-
tions 2) begins by drafting a quantitative formula concerning the
Influence of one Individual upon another. In this formula he
uses two variables: the "intensity of an activity" and "desire.,
which is, In its turn, determined in general by the past history¦of the Individual." 3) The book does not indicate how the values
for these variables might be obtained. The present writer Is by
no means a protagonist of the operational definition as a method
of defining concepts in qualitative discourse, 4) but it seems
quite useless to set up equations without being able to indicate
any operation by which the numerical values of the variables can
be determined. Rashevsky arbitrarily chooses the type of func-
tion relating the variables and does, of course, not know the
l) John J. O'Neill, "Scientists Use Figures, Equations to Describe Processes of Life.
New Mathematics of Mankind Called Social Physics- Includes Brain Waves, Interna-
tional Relations, Machines." in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April11, 1949.
2) N. Rashevsky, Mathematical Theory of Human Relations, An Approach to a Mathematical
Biology of Social Phenomena, The Prinoipia Press, Inc., Bloomington, Indiana, 1947.
3) Ibid., p. 3 ff.
4) Franz Adler, "Operational Definitions in Sociology", The American Journal of
Sociology, Vol. LII,No. 5, March 1947, pp. 438-444.
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numerical value of his constants. Thus, all we have is an arbi-
trary relationship of unknowns, as far as the mathematics of the
matter go.
Rashevsky calls his theory a deductive one. Still, it is
based on some conceptions of the actual happenings among people.
The author has consulted a few sociological treatises, but seems
to rely mostly on his own common sense knowledge, general educa-
tion, and some biological analogies. His book abounds in state-
ments like the following: "it must be remembered that in the
ultimate analysis any natural resource, used in any industry,
comes from the land; s) "An individual may imitate another one,
and if this individual engages in an activity, a', with an inten-
sity, 1', then the intensity, a, of the activity of the first
individual will be the stronger, the stronger the a.';" 6
'
"Due to
the difference between parents and progeny, the active industrial
class in the United States gradually 'thins out'." 7) These
statements are neither based on empirical research nor are they
credited to any social scientist, they rather seem to represent
the author's own views.
A deductive theory will most probably be useful only to the
extent as it is founded on valid Induction. Whether this original
Induction is formal or informal is not the point. But only in-
duction of some sort (if we exclude supernatural inspiration) can
be expected to lead to a realistic theory. Whatever the mathema-
tical merits of the author may be, he should have consulted some
sociologists (and there are some of them who are well qualified
to talk to a mathematician) as to the available observational
materials and as to available methods of measurement. The bare
mathematical "let-this-be-that" cannot be expected to lead neces-
sarily to formulas that can be applied to empirical events.
The second of the works cited in the initially mentioned
press story comes from George Klngsley Zlpf,8' University lectur-
er at Harvard University, whose training and activities have been
mostly in the field of speech and linguistics. The speculations
of this volume, showing a brilliant power of imagination, start
out from studies and findings inthis field which demonstrate, as
far as the present writer, a layman, can judge, thorough famil-
iarity with subject matter and method.
The author, however, steps out from his familiar field Into
physics to.borrow from there a principle which he somewhat modi-
fies. In physics, this principle appears as an equation
t]
6/2Tdt = 0, called the principle of least action .9) It is per-
to
haps important to notice that the above equation is valid only if
the total energy remains constant and the same over every varied
path. It should also be noted that it yields a maximum rather
than a minimum in some cases. 10) Ithas to be modified to be ap-
plicable to other problems than those of mechanics (see Fermat's
principle of least time in optics) and offers special difficulties
if the propagation of light is treated as a motion of corpuscles
moving with the velocity of light. n)
5) Rashevsky, op. oit., p. 168.
6) Ibid., p. 4.
7) Ibid,, p. 180.
8) George Kingsley Zipf, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort, An Intro-
duction to Human Ecology, Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1949.
9) Robert Bruce Lindsay and Henry Margenau, Foundations of Physics, Jojm Wiley Je
Sons, Inc., New York, Chapman & Hall, Limited, London, 1936, p. 132; (T = kinetic
energy, t = time).
10) F.K. Richtmyer and E.H. Kennard, Introduction to Modern Physics, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., New York and London, 4th edition, 1947, p. 244.
11) Lindsay and Margenau, op. cit., p. 135.
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Transposed Into the fields of biology and the social scien-
ces this principle of least action Is universalized without any
restriction or condition as a principle of least effort, and the
author claims that It will facilitate a systematlzatlon of an
exact science of living behavior, that It willprovide an objec-
tive language for the Impersonal discussion of social problems,
and that finally It willfulfillthe need for a way In which man
can explain the ways of God to man.12 ) Itwill be recalled that
the original Inventor of the principle of least action In physics,
Maupertuls, In 1750 had a purpose similar to Zipfs In wanting to
prove the existence of a creator God. The principle of least ef-
fort says that each organism will adopt a way of matter-energy
output that will involve the expenditure of the probable least
average rate of work. 13' The organism will choose this way on
the basis of Its or Its species' past experience according to Its
own insight and ability. 14 ) Obviously such a broad principle
cannot easily be put into mathematical terms and the author has
not attempted to do so, thus actually disqualifying himself for
the claims made for him by the press report.
That the author is in foreign waters in the social sciences
becomes apparent, for example, by his treatment of what he des-
cribes by the phrase "tools-seek- jobs-and- jobs-seek-tools" . The
whole question of the means-quality of ends and the ends-quality
of means is left open. 15 ) As a result we get an enormously ex-
panded "economic man" - not to mention all the economic mice,
rats, trees, and algae - not understood as a construct, but as
concrete description and explanation of all human actions,
economic and otherwise. Obviously, actual human behavior does
not follow always and everywhere an economic principle of least
effort. Men Indulge In sports for no other purpose than to ex-
pend effort, they overindulge knowingly In efforts of socalled
amusement, they even commit suicide. Zipf does not face these
difficulties of his view squarely, but endeavors to overcome them
by adding additional assumptions to his structure whenever the
occasion arises. Thus, for example, he takes care of the problem
of suicide by postulating "a self-preservating 'something' in an
organism which can eventually wish to escape Into some other sit-
uation which is comparatively less frustrating In terms of some
frame of reference. 16' The "something", reading of previous and
following passages leads us to understand. Is an "identity point",
which in Zlpf 's discussion starts out as a movable mathematical
point in time-space", 17^ but which in the course of the argument
becomes a very definite, though not tangible, thing.
As a whole, Zipf's work can hardly be considered as a scien-
tific contribution to the social sciences, much less as their
mathematical systematlzation. The author of the newspaper report
must be excused for having succumbed to the Harvard title of the
author and the learned sounding verbiage of the work.
Quite on a different level appears the work of Norbert
Wiener. 18) Wiener does not try to transplant physical and biolo-
gical concepts or methods by a priori reasoning upon universes of
12) Zipf, op. oit., pp. 543f.
13) Ibid., pp. 5ff and passim.
14) Ibid., p. 7.
15) of. for example. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,
translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, Oxford University Press, Nevr
York, 1947, pp. 115ff., or the materials treated by Morris Ginsberg in his Reason
and Unreason in Society, Essaya in Sociology and Social Philosophy, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, passim.
16) Zipf, op. oit., p. 243.
17) Ibid., p. 212.
18) Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the
Machine , The Technology Press, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, Hermann et
Cie, Paris, 1948.
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phenomena of which he has no scientific knowledge. Working with
physiologists and engineers, he uses their experiences to find by
Induction mathematical formulations that seem well to describe
certain processes common to certain machines and to the human
brain. He finds that a mathematical theory will be essentially
the same In describing processes of mathematical or logical com-
putation, no matter whether these computations are performed by a
mechanical calculator or by a human brain. And the study of the
actual phenomena carried on by his medical and engineering asso-
ciates shows that the similarity Is not only one of function but
one of structure too. This is Important to remember so as not to
confuse Wiener's theory with reasoning by analogy. His is a
theory arrived at by induction Inwhich several formerly separate
fields are united into a new unity.
Wiener's inductive method is also the reason why he did not
advance to a theory of society. He Is aware of the lack of rele-
vant quantitative data in this field. And he puts his finger
with a rare degree of Insight directly on the reason for this
lack of data: "Thus the human sciences are very poor testing-
grounds for a new mathematical technique: as poor as the statis-
tical mechanics of a gas would be to a being of the order of size
of a molecule, to whom the fluctuations which we ignore from a
larger standpoint would be precisely the matters of greatest in-
terest." 19 ' This is exactly the reason why quantitative research
of purely theoretically important matters has been neglected in
favor of Inquiring Into matters of immediate practical Importance
That the latter types of research do not add much In terms of ad-
vance toward a mathematical theory of society is not further sur-
prising.
Wiener's well founded reluctance to enter a field in which
he did not feel at home and which did not offer him sufficient
data must be highly commended. At the same time Itbecomes nec-
essary for the sociologist to ask himself whether this situation
could- not possibly be remedied. Is It conceivable at all that
sociologists produce data which might serve as the raw material
for the mathematical system builder?
The first question to be asked Is what kind of data could be
appropriate for the setting up of a quantitative theory. It Is
obvious that they will have to be quantitative, but how will It
be possible to distinguish relevant quantitative data from irre-
levant ones? This, Itseems, can be done only on the basis of a
hypothesis. This hypothesis willhave to be a qualitative one.
Any qualitative system of sociology could conceivably serve this
purpose .
This Is not the place and there is not the time to discuss
all the systems of sociology which have been suggested at various
times. Be It enough to state that the present writer is most
strongly Indebted to the Wiese-Becker z0 > system and uses it as
the starting point for his own. To be useful as a basis for the
planning of research which is to lead to the setting up of a
quantitative system, a qualitative system must, it seems, fulfill
two main requirements:
1. All concepts of the system must refer to directly or in-
directly observable data and combinations of such data. Such data
are, at least conceivably, measurable or countable.
19) Ibid., p. 34j of. also pp. 181 ff.
20) Leopold von Wiese, Systematic Sociology, on the Basis of the BeziehunRs and
Gebildelehre, adapted and amplified by Howard Becker, New York, John Wiley ft Sons,
Inc., London, Chapman * Hall,Limited, 1932. This reference should, however, not
be construed to mean that Wiese and Becker carry any responsibility for the
present writer's concepts.
88
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 3 [1950], Art. 19
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol3/iss1/19
89
2. All concepts of the system must refer to the same kind
of data. By choosing a focus of interest and a level of observa-
tion the system becomes the system of a special science rather
than a description of the whole universe or arbitrarily selected
bits thereof. Also reference to the same kind of data assures
the clarification of concepts and conceptual relationships. It
becomes impossible to talk about the same phenomenon under sever-
al different names seemingly referring to several different sub-
ject matters.
Sociology has been defined as the science of social actions
tlons. 21' The only data, then, to which any concept in this
science is to have reference, are social actions. An action is
to be understood in the widest sense as anything an organism
does, including its persistence in a state of non-motion. 22 ) Ac-
tions may be fully overt, that is they may consist of muscular
movement and nothing else. Such actions, as for example, a hit in
the jaw during a serious fight, are fully observable. Then there
are actions which are completely covert, like thinking, seeing,
hearing, feeling, etc. These remain unobservable and cannot as
such enter sociological investigation. Finally, there are ac-
tions which are overt, but which are related to covert actions.
These socalled symbolic actions are most important in social re-
lationships.
It is not the task of the sociologist to study the relations
among the various levels of action. This is done by the psychol-
ogist, and the sociologist has to accept his findings. If the
psychologist cannot or does not give him direct ways of connect-
ing the overt to some covert actions, the sociologist will define
the "meaning" of an action by its relation to the set of actions(or the "situation") in connection with which the action usually
occurs. This set will include those actions which have been con-
firmed as occurring with high probability in connection with the
action the meaning of which is to be determined. This procedure
may enable the sociologist to leave out any reference to unob-
servable, covert actions. If a sentence, for example, occurs in
a given situation after certain actions have occurred and. before
certain other actions do occur, and if such a use tends to recur
with some regularity, an observer who does not know the language
in which the sentence is spoken may nevertheless grasp its
meaning.
Sociology, it was said, deals with social actions. An ac-
tion is social if It is followed by an action of another Indivi-
dual. The action that follows must be of a kind that more or
less regularly follows the kind of action the first action re-
presented. Only due to this regularity of sequence we can and
do claim a connection between the two actions. 23^
At first sight not all actions seem to be social. It is
quite correct to state that people do things by themselves pro-
tected from any other presence by four walls and the darkness
and the silence around them. Such actions are not only not soc-
ial, but they are also not observable. Thus, they fall outside
the field of a science which demands observable fact as Its
basis. Any action, however, occurring in the presence of ano-
ther, is, as a rule, observed; the fact of observation alone
makes the action a social one and all observed human actions are
social actions.
21) Ibid., p. 65.
22) cf. for a quite different view of what constitutes an action: Talcott Parsons,
The Structure of Social Action, First Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New
York and London, 1937, p. 44 and passim.
23) cf. for opposite views of what constitutes a social aotion, Florian Znanieoki,
Social Actions, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., New York, 1936, pp. 72ff. and Leopold
von Wiese, op. cit., pp. 56ff.
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We have said that all phenomena dealt with by this science
will have to be defined as social actions. The first concept so
defined willbe "culture". It consists of all the learned recur-
rent ways of acting that distinguish a population using them from
populations not using them; Ifman would do anything by Instinct,
this would not enter Into culture. But the psychologists assure
us that everything man does Is done In a learned manner, even
breathing, digesting, cohabltating, etc. These ways of acting or
recurrent actions occur more frequently among some peoples than
among others. Thus they may be said to distinguish a population
within which they occur often from one within which they occur
rarely or never. Actions are connected with each other and occur In
sequences and clusters. Itis, then, naive to speak of a "sum of
actions 0 making up a culture. Actions occur in arrangements like
the parts of a machine which have to be articulated with each
other to produce any effect. Such arrangements are known under
the name of "culture patterns".
"Society" is defined as the network of social actions going
on at any given time.24 ) It is a cross section through the cul-
tural continuity. Thus, most of the actions found at the moment
going on among and between individuals willbe repetitions of
previous actions. There will, however, be a few actions going on
that may be new. These actions may later be repeated and thus
become part of the culture, or they may not be repeated. These
seemingly unique actions are the beginnings and the indicators of
change. And the fact that such actions do occur more or less
frequently compared to recurrent ones is also a characteristic of
the culture.
Culture and society cannot exist without the existence of
Individuals. There have to be actors so that we may have actions.
The individual Interests us here as an actor only. As a physical
phenomenon, as a biological organism, as a mixture of chemical
substances he is not of Interest. His actions, observed and
typed, show certain regularities. These regularities in their
relations to each other are the Individual's "personality", that
Is the predictable actor. We may, for example, discover regular-
ities in the relation of the Individual's ways of overt and sym-
bolic actions and may characterize him on this basis as a liar or
an honest man, as consistent or inconsistent, as an optimist or
pessimist, and we can thus predict with certain probabilities
certain characteristics of his actions.
A personality, then, consists of the recurrent ways of act-
Ing of an individual. Culture, we have said, consists of the
recurrent ways of acting In a population. There can be no action
in culture that is not somebody's action. It Is obvious that all
and every individual's ways of acting are part of the culture.
But are all actions within a culture part of somebody's personal-
ity? We have said that actions must be typed when they are ob-
served. Accurate observation by itself reveals
(
that no particu-
lar action is fully like any other particular action. We have,
then, to decide on what basis we intend to consider actions as
alike. No such typology has been worked out yet in this con-
text. 25)
Itwill be possible, of course, to set up a category of
"traditional actions" or "ritual actions", etc. Thus, if we know
that an individual has acted traditionally or ceremonially in
previous situations, we may assume with some probability that
another situation for which traditional or ceremonial ways of
24) of Leopold von Wiese, op. oit., p. 77.
25) The lists of Leopold von Wiese (op. oit., pp. 134ff, and passim) or Florian Znanieki(op. cit., pp. 135ff.) do not correspond to the present definitions and are far from
exhaustive.
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acting are available will also be dealt with by him in a tradi-
tional or ceremonial manner. On the other hand, if we have ob-
served that the individual usually meets such situations by his
own devices, we may predict that he will do so again. His tra-
ditional or untraditional behavior is part of his personality.
Thus even a specific action which the Individual will perform
only once in his life, let us say, for example, acceptance of
baptism or marriage, appears as part of his "ways of acting". We
may conclude, then, that there is nothing in culture which is not
In the personality of somebody in the population.
Culture was often thought of as being one set of patterns
for every situation from which the individual could deviate only
by breaking the law, the customs, the mores, etc., In other words,
by putting himself outside of the pale of culture. Recent stu-
dents of prel Iterate societies have reported that there is a wide
range of behavior observable in every society with many grada-
tions from the fully approved to the fully disapproved. 2^ We
know, today, that we must distinguish between statistically nor-
mal behavior and the range of actual behavior on the one hand and
idealized desirable behavior on the other. Our culture contains
all kinds of patterns of business behavior, for example: from
the Puritan small town New England business man to the protection
or syndicate rackateer of Chicago or St. Louis, there are many
kinds and variations of business men, but the Horatio Algers
among them are relatively rare. Our culture, however, comprises
all their ways of acting.
What is now the relation of personality and society? The
actions that at any given moment constitute society are actions
of individuals. They are either actions of a type previously
performed by the Individual or they are new. In the latter case
they may be the beginning of new personality elements and new
culture elements or they may remain unique and never recur. It
is the number, frequency, and type of these new actions that
will give us the probability and the probable direction of change.
It is fashionable today to define cultures as value systems.
There is no objection to this if we define values In terms of
actions. Any action is valuation. It is the only observable
valuation. What a man does in a given situation is obviously what
under the given circumstances he wants to do more than anything
else. He may talk in one way and act in another which only means
that he has one value for symbolic and another for overt action.
A man's ways of acting are his values. The ways of acting of a
culture are this culture's actual value system.
There are, however, symbolic systems observable In every
culture which define cultural expectations. Expectations are
ways of acting which have meaning by preceding certain actions of
another individual. These ways of acting actually occur or may
merely be talked about. Out of them a student of sociology can
construct something that can be or may be used as a kind of cul-
tural superego. In other words, reference to these ways of act-
ing may be used as a lever for action, as a basis for propaganda.
The fact that people in a culture think of themselves as having
certain ways of acting does by no means prove that they do have
such ways of acting, but it has been found that reference to these
ways is a useful method of social control.
Itis a grave error to assume that cultures do not change.
Individuals are steadily changing their relations to other indivi-
duals and to things. A social relationship is to be understood as
the recurrence of certain types of actions between or among some
26) of for example Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works, Alfred A. Knopf, New
York, 1948, pp. 64, 484, 563, etc.
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Individuals and the probability that this recurrence willcon-
tinue. Relations to things consist In the recurrence and probae
blllty.of further recurrence of certain actions toward these
things. Such relations change. They may be brought Into being
or they may be discontinued, they may be Intensified (the proba-
bility of recurrence Is raised) or they may be weakened (the
probability Is lowered). Itmay be possible to Isolate series of
actions by which such changes are brought about. These will be
called processes. 27^ Processes going on between individuals will
change the society. If they lead to new types of relationships
they will also change the culture.
It willbe seen that such terms can be added in any desired
number and they can be defined In a consistent manner. Thus
we may define an institution as all the ways of acting around a
culturally determined focus; we may define an establishment as
all those actions within an institution that center around cul-
turally distinguished individuals (as In case of any particular
family) or things (as In case of a particular school or church);
and so on.28 )
What are we gaining by defining our terms in this way? It
seems that they become accessible to quantitative research which
was what we originally set out to achieve. But beyond that, we
reach some Immediate Insights. If we say that personality,
society, and culture consist of the same materials, namely the
actions of the individual, we cannot hold that culture or society
force the Individual into the life he leads. They offer him
choices which he may or may not accept. 29) Ifhe refuses accep-
tance and introduces new ways of action, he changes, society and
culture change too. Ifhe changes alone, the change willbe
minimal. Ifhe changes and his change is followed by many simi-
lar changes of others, the change In the culture and in the soci-
ety will be noticeable. Other Individuals may prevent him from
performing certain actions, they may prevent others from follow-
ing his new example. But they too are but Individuals whose per-
sonalities are changeable - whatever their probability of acting
in a certain manner may be, it is but a probability. It is the
task of sociology to study concretely the types of action which
in certain types of situations bring about certain types of
changes rather than to moan fatalistically about the difficulty
Involved in changing the mores.
27) cf. Leopold von Wiese, op. cit., p. 72 or George A. Lundberg, Foundations of
Sociology, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1939, p. 256.
28) of. Leopold von Wiese, op. cit., p. 402, or F. Stuart Chapin, Contemporary
American Institutions, A Sociological Analysis, Harper and Brothers Publishers,
New York and London, 1935, pp. 14, 412, for different approaches.
29) cf.Franz Adler, "The Social Thought of Jean Paul Sartre", forthcoming in the
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LV, No. 3, pp. 284-294.
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